Rarely has a head of government been so celebrated for a speech. But rarely has a speech been as necessary as the one delivered by the Canadian Prime Minister. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Mark Carney did something that has become unusual in today’s debate: he openly contradicted President Trump. In doing so, he raised a fundamental question. How can open economies remain capable of action when economic power politics becomes the norm?

Europe is under pressure – in trade, energy, raw materials and key industries. Tariffs, export controls, informal boycotts and targeted restrictions on supply chains are no longer the exception. They have become part of geopolitical normality.

The hope that this development can be contained simply by professing commitment to multilateralism is no longer viable. Global rules are losing their enforceability. Multilateral forums still generate legitimacy, but increasingly rarely produce binding outcomes. While committees deliberate, facts are created elsewhere. Today, international cooperation is less effective through new rules than through the ability to coordinate concrete measures and share economic risks.

For Europe, this realisation is unpleasant but inevitable. The question is no longer whether economic power politics is on the rise. Who would doubt that these days? The question is whether Europe can respond together with its partners – or whether individual countries will continue to come under pressure on their own. This is where Carney’s widely publicised call for a solid core of middle powers comes in.

This does not refer to a new fixed bloc, but rather closer cooperation between highly industrialised democracies: the EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the United Kingdom are usually mentioned prominently here. These countries share more than political values. They face a similar strategic situation: economically open, technologically advanced, closely linked to the US in security terms – and at the same time increasingly exposed to external economic pressure.

This shared starting point explains why the debate is gaining momentum. All of these countries are potentially vulnerable to pressure from the United States. Repeated tariff threats, unilateral action and the instrumental use of market power affect not only traditional rivals, but also – and especially - long-standing partners. Canada, the EU, Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom have all recently experienced how quickly economic relations can be politicised. Even close allies are not immune to pressure, special tariffs or extraterritorial measures.

At the same time, dependence on China is deepening – as a sales market, but especially as a market-dominating supplier of key components. China’s dominance in rare earths, battery materials and key industrial inputs is structural – and can be leveraged politically at any time. For open economies such as the EU, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, this creates a double vulnerability: to US unpredictability and to Chinese market power.

Closer cooperation is therefore not an expression of ambition, but a response to reality. Europe will only be able to exert global influence if it forms targeted coalitions. This more flexible form of cooperation is politically demanding. Interests diverge – even among industrialised countries, and within the EU itself. Any viable alliance must therefore meet two requirements: it must be robust enough to withstand external pressure, and flexible enough to accommodate internal differences.

The focus has to be on practical cooperation where competitiveness and security of supply are decided: trade, key technologies, standards and protection against economic coercion. The potential of a core group of middle powers is particularly evident in clean tech. Few areas combine geopolitical vulnerability, industrial competitiveness and strategic dependence as directly. Batteries, electrolysers, power grids, power electronics and critical raw materials are no longer just elements of climate policy. They have become central to economic security.

This is also where the structural weakness of open economies becomes visible. Dependence on China affects not only end products, but upstream stages, processing capacities and economies of scale. At the same time, individual countries often lack -unlike China - the market size needed to set standards or mobilise investment fast enough. This is precisely where a core group of middle powers could make a difference: through common standards, coordinated funding, joint procurement of critical components and aligned demand for key technologies. The bundling of demand for critical raw materials is becoming increasingly important. Joint procurement, purchase guarantees and coordinated reserves reduce exposure to political pressure. The same applies for shared project pipelines, coordinated risk-sharing instruments, fast-track certification for jointly prioritised technologies, and practical safeguarding mechanisms.

Those who invest, produce, and scale together in clean tech not only reduce dependencies but also gain strategic advantages. They create markets that are resilient to coercion. This is the strategic added value of such a core group.

Realism is essential. A permanently unified alliance that follows a single line on all issues is unlikely. What is realistic is a binding core of industrialised countries that cooperates closely in key areas while retaining room for manoeuvre elsewhere. Capacity to act does not stem from maximum unity, but from clear priorities and the ability to mobilise credible instruments.

Not every partner needs to be equally involved in every field. What matters is that there are core areas where cooperation is binding – and where deviation entails tangible costs in the form of greater vulnerability. Cooperation must be linked to real incentives: market access, financing and joint projects. It also requires crisis mechanisms that activate when political pressure emerges, not only once it has already taken effect.

A binding core of the EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the United Kingdom would not signal hegemonic ambition. It would be a pragmatic response to shared vulnerabilities. The alternative is familiar – and unappealing: ad hoc reactions, bilateral deals under pressure and a gradual erosion of Europe’s capacity to act.

Such a core group would not be a closed club. Cooperation with emerging and developing economies remains crucial, particularly in clean tech. Their starting points and priorities differ, which makes coordination more complex. This only increases the importance of compatible standards and credible offers of cooperation. They do not prevail automatically; they must be competitive.

In a world shaped by economic power politics, cooperation is no longer an ideal. It is a means of self-protection. Europe must organise it accordingly – together with partners who face the same risks and are prepared to chart a new course