In Moscow’s Crosshairs / Fake Greetings from Moscow

Disinformation has long been part of geopolitical power politics. Wherever it is deployed, the aim is to divide societies, undermine trust, and shape political decisions. One particularly effective arena is climate and energy policy. This is where costs and lifestyles, security and prosperity collide. Debates are often emotionally charged—making the issue an ideal entry point for populists. Along these fault lines, tensions can easily be sharpened.

These attacks are by no means limited to the usual suspects of the fossil fuel industry. A meta-analysis of around 300 studies by the International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE) shows that fossil companies, right-wing populist politicians, and selected states play a significant role in climate-related disinformation. It does not take constant exposure. Even brief contact with disinformation is enough to undermine trust, weaken support, and make risks appear greater than they are.

While the use of this tactical tool has become increasingly visible in the United States, one central actor has been operating systematically in the background for years: Russia. Moscow is at the forefront of this disinformation effort—and it acts out of clear self-interest. The power of the Russian government under President Putin rests on oil and gas. It is in its interest to keep Europe dependent on fossil fuels. This secures not only revenues, but also preserves a key lever of coercion. Those who control supply can exert political pressure.

At the same time, climate policy offers opportunities to forge political alliances. The narratives reinforce one another. Climate policy is framed as a project of a detached elite—urban, centered in capitals or Brussels, and allegedly directed against “ordinary people.” In this way, existing social tensions can be deliberately amplified. The objective is political paralysis.

Disinformation does not arise by chance. It follows clear patterns and relies on established infrastructures. Research by EU DisinfoLab shows how narratives are first placed in smaller, harder-to-regulate channels and then systematically amplified—through Telegram networks, alternative media, and coordinated accounts on platforms. Content is translated into multiple languages, adapted, and multiplied across platforms. This creates the impression of a broad, organically grown debate—even though many of these narratives trace back to the same limited set of sources.

A particularly striking example is the so-called “Doppelgänger” campaign. Websites of major media outlets are convincingly copied and filled with manipulated content. These materials are then spread via social media and coordinated accounts—sometimes even through paid advertising. For readers, they are often almost indistinguishable from legitimate reporting. In this way, seemingly credible sources emerge that deliberately spread false or distorted information. Disinformation appears in the guise of journalism.

Another pattern reinforces this dynamic: content is deployed across multiple countries at the same time—often with only minimal adjustments. The same narratives appear almost simultaneously in different languages and circulate through different channels. What looks like a broad international debate is, in fact, the result of coordinated campaigns.

Social media further accelerates this dynamic. Polarizing content spreads faster, is shared more widely, and reaches larger audiences. It intersects with existing societal fault lines—on energy prices, cost of living, or social justice. That is precisely where it has the greatest impact.

That these dynamics have real-world consequences is particularly evident in the expansion of wind energy – already a frequent target for opponents of the energy transition. According to analyses by the European wind industry, including the industry association WindEurope in cooperation with the think tank CASM Technology, deliberately spread false claims about alleged health risks, economic damage, and environmental impacts are circulating on social media. These narratives shape local debates, delay permitting procedures, and in some cases even lead to the cancellation of projects. What begins as a digital narrative has direct effects on investments and critical infrastructure.

This trend can be observed across Europe. Projects worth billions have already been delayed or abandoned, often in the context of campaigns based on distorted or misleading information. Attacks on installations are also becoming more frequent. From the industry’s perspective, disinformation is thus emerging as a direct threat to Europe’s energy security and investment climate.

According to the association, platforms need to take stronger action against coordinated campaigns—particularly where there are indications of organised or foreign interference. At the same time, reactive measures alone are not sufficient. There is also a need to strengthen digital literacy across the population, as a prerequisite for recognising manipulative content in the first place.

Infrastructure, too, will need to be planned and implemented with significantly greater resilience. Unlike traditional lobbying, Russia’s approach is not limited to communication alone. Disinformation is part of a broader hybrid toolkit. This includes cyberattacks, sabotage, and targeted interference with critical infrastructure. These instruments reinforce one another.

This becomes particularly clear in the energy sector. Through cyber espionage, information on critical infrastructure is systematically gathered. An attack on power grids or supply systems—even if only temporary—would have immediate consequences: outages, uncertainty, rising prices.

The decisive element, however, is the second wave. Such a crisis is accompanied and amplified through communication. A supply disruption turns into a crisis of confidence. Doubts about the stability of energy systems merge with existing narratives—about supposedly unreliable renewables, “failed” climate policy, and a state no longer capable of fulfilling its core functions.

A cascade effect emerges: technical disruption, economic insecurity, and targeted disinformation reinforce one another. The state appears unable to act, political conflicts intensify, and social divisions deepen.

In the end, this is not just about energy or climate policy. It is about interaction: Russia provides the narratives, right-wing actors pick them up and amplify them, and fossil interests benefit. A cycle takes shape—one that undermines trust and drives political paralysis.

Alongside the United States and Russia, other actors also promote fossil-based business interests. The Gulf states rely on PR, economic interlinkages, and political influence—for example to advance carbon capture and storage or so-called lower-emission fossil fuels. Their approach, however, follows a different logic. The focus is on shaping political processes, not on the systematic distortion of public debate.